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Introduction
This paper examines the mutual constraints operating on monetary and …scal policy in a standard model with sticky prices and endogenous output variation. We establish a number of propositions that will ensure a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for such a model. A number of contributions (e.g., Woodford, 2003) have emphasized a set of principles for monetary policy. Notably there is the well-known proposition, linked to the name of John Taylor, which suggests that anything more than an equiproportional increase in the short-term interest rate, following an increase in in ‡ation, is su¢ cient to ensure a unique REE. 1 We note that this proposition is subject to the lacunae that fully characterized stabilization policy requires consideration of both monetary and …scal policy. This insight is of particular interest when monetary policy is constrained in some manner, for example because of a zero lower bound or when …scal policy adopts a particularly aggressive approach to output stabilization. Accordingly, in this paper we develop versions of this proposition, extended to incorporate various roles for …scal policy. The joint determination of monetary and …scal policies as a stabilization device is well recognized. 2 Recent work on simple policy rules has shown that an optimal monetary and …scal policy should respond systematically to in ‡ation and output, respectively, as this will stabilize the economy well. 3 But as well as establishing principles for optimality, we would also wish to know more generally what mutual constraints apply to these two branches of stabilization policy in order to establish a unique REE. As a number of authors have noted, there is no guarantee that actual monetary and …scal policy is conducted optimally. That being the case, understanding the wider issues discussed in this paper appear important. There are clear policy implications, for example, in both the Eurozone and in the UK, monetary and …scal reform has tried to develop hand in glove with the joint aims of achieving price and economic stability but in the Eurozone there remain many question marks over how such coordination should proceed that may ultimately undermine the monetary union. 4 Furthermore if monetary policy is constrained and cannot act in a manner consistent with the Taylor Principle, for example, when facing the zero lower bound or within a monetary union, …scal policy may be required to ensure stability. In this paper, we …nd that if …scal policy tries to stabilize either or both of output or in ‡ation aggressively there are important implications for the operating procedure of an interest rate setting authority, speci…cally that a signi…cantly more active rule is required. Emerging economies may also have the problem of dealing with an aggressive …scal policy maker and so may have to design monetary policy to consider a more active rule than that suggested by the Taylor Principle.
In a standard New Keynesian model, where both output and in ‡ation are forward-looking, we …nd that there are tensions between the arms of stabilization policy because of the nature of instruments employed. The interest rate operates multiplicatively to tilt private output (consumption) whereas …scal policy acts additively. Under a monetary theory of the price level (MTPL), the economy can be well stabilized by the nominal interest rate which controls e¤ectively the per period ‡ow of demand by setting intertemporal prices. On the other hand, …scal policy a¤ects the overall level of current demand, scaling output up or down, and is ultimately less e¤ective at stabilizing private sector welfare losses following a shock. The implication of our analysis for monetary policy is that (i) more attention should be paid to commitment devices for the …scal policy maker to avoid aggressive acts of stabilization and that (ii) because of the possibility of deleterious impact arising from an exuberant …scal policy maker, a monetary policy maker should be somewhat concerned with output rather than simply in ‡ation stabilization. The recent call for independent …scal councils by the OECD (2010) and other policymaking institutes thus seems to be well judged.
We also clarify the role of monetary policy under the …scal theory of the price level (FTPL), where the price level must adjust to alter the value of nominal debt and ensure that it equals a given stream of …scal surpluses. Here in ‡ation control is no longer the concern of the monetary authority with stabilization left to the …scal policy. If we …nd this outcome unattractive and wish to maintain MTPL then, as already argued, we need to call for ongoing …scal commitments to stabilize the level of debt in expectation, which may imply the announcement of plans consistent with this objective. Overall, it turns out that in order to maintain a simple interest rate strategy to stabilize the economy there are a number of key restrictions that need to be placed on the expected operation of …scal policy. On the other hand if the MTPL cannot be maintained, for example if interest rates have hit the zero lower bound, then we are able to ask ourselves what kind of …scal policy rule is required to ensure determinacy. It turns out that unstable debt levels and aggressive …scal policy may be required to stabilise an economy, in which the interest rate is constrained, and this will complicate the transition from MTPL to FTPL and back to MTPL again, or what has been termed the exit strategy in policy circles.
Apart from analyzing Ricardian (which allows the MTPL) and non-Ricardian …scal policy (which leads to the FTPL), we also …nd it useful to partition …scal policy into two separate zones: moderate and aggressive. The former (latter) is characterized by the weight on output and in ‡ation in the …scal rule being below (above) the reciprocal of the share of government expenditure in output. 5 Consider …rst Ricardian …scal policy. 6 It turns out that the standard ( Taylor Rule) case for monetary stabilization is a special case, where …scal policy is necessarily moderate. But under an aggressive (but Ricardian) …scal policy we …nd that the Taylor Principle is increasingly insu¢ cient to guarantee a unique REE and some additional targeting of output by monetary policy is required. Under nonRicardian …scal policy, we …nd that the further characterization of …scal policy as moderate or aggressive places additional restrictions on the feasible sequences of interest rates; if …scal policy is non-Ricardian and aggressive then the in ‡ation stabilization role of an interest rate rule will be irrelevant to the determination of a unique REE. This result might be of some use in considering the appropriate response of …scal policy under a lower zero bound, which might be to deliver highly aggressive …scal policy.
In Section 2 we provide a short overview of some of the tensions that arise between monetary and …scal policy via the public sector present value budget constraint. Section 3 develops the model we use to characterize operational monetary and …scal policy. Section 4 derives conditions for this model that ensure the existence of a unique REE in each of four regions where …scal policy is either moderate or aggressive and Ricardian or non-Ricardian. Section 5 concludes with 5 For output the threshhold results from whether …scal policy acts to overcompensate for booms or recessions by overstimulating demand to turn boom into recession and vice versa. For in ‡ation, the result derives from the New Keynesian Phillips curve derived in Section 3.2 and stated in B4, which expresses in ‡ation as the current value of expected output gaps. If these output gaps, via …scal policy are also a function of in ‡ation, then it turns out that the appropriate discount rate to apply on future output gaps falls and hence in ‡ation becomes more sensitive to output gaps, requiring a more aggressive interest rate rule. See Section 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.3 for further details. 6 Ricardian …scal policy is de…ned under Proposition 4.1 and involves a …scal commitment to stabilise the nominal value of public liabilities. In the absence of such a commitment nonRicardian …scal policy occurs.
some observations on policy. The Appendix explains the …scal set-up, the detailed derivations of the model of section 3.
The Public Sector Present Value Budget Constraint
Traditionally economists have argued that the public sector faces a present-value budget constraint (PVBC) similar to that of private agents. Given a quantity (real value) of public liabilities, the government must plan for its expected stream of discounted net surpluses to be just su¢ cient to meet these liabilities. In other words, the government's PVBC must hold identically for any feasible equilibrium sequence of the economy's other variables, notably the price-level and the interest rate. In this section we set out the restriction implied by the PVBC for the interest rate. This is a key illustration of the results we derive in Sections 3 and 4 for a fully- ‡edged dynamic model. We show that a more (less) aggressive …scal policy reduces (increases) the upper bound on the feasible sequence of interest rates. In later sections we show that increasingly aggressive …scal policy, either towards output or in ‡ation, correspondingly increases the need for o¤setting monetary responses.
We can take the analysis further and, indeed, a recent literature due to Leeper (1991) , Sims (1994) , Woodford (1997 Woodford ( , 2001 ) and Cochrane (2001) , relaxes the requirement that the PVBC is an identity in all states of nature. Nevertheless, the PVBC continues to be a relationship that is satis…ed in equilibrium. A de…ning characteristic of this …scal theory of the price-level is a presumption that …scal authorities do not typically coordinate their 'actions' -speci…cally their temporal (contingency) sequences for tax rates and government expenditure. We also characterize the mutual restrictions on monetary and …scal policy in this case.
Some budgetary arithmetic
We outline the budgetary implications of the public sector PVBC in terms of the interaction of monetary and …scal policy. Consider a deterministic economy, in 6 which wealth takes one of two forms: money, which earns no interest, and oneperiod nominal, riskless bonds, which do earn interest. The period public sector ‡ow budget constraint is given by:
where B t is the nominal quantity of debt maturing in t + 1, i t is the nominal interest rate between period t and t + 1, P t is the aggregate price level,
is the real primary de…cit in period t, and (M t M t 1 ) is seigniorage raised in period t. A central assumption is that the monetary-…scal sequences avoid Ponzi schemes, such that the sequence of nominal debt stocks have a zero value in the limit,
This condition ensures that the PVBC is satis…ed and, given the level of outstanding liabilities at the start of any time period, the ensuing temporal sequence of net surpluses plus seigniorage is able to meet those liabilities. Let T t denote the period t tax yield. We will analyze …scal rules (or regimes) of the following form
Fiscal policy is characterized by the sequence f( t+s ; t+s )g T s=0 , that is by choices on the size of de…cit, (1 )G, and on the extent to which outstanding debt is retired, . Let 0 < < 1, which corresponds to the portion of outstanding debt carried over from the previous period. For simplicity, let us further assume that seigniorage revenue is rebated lump sum to the private sector. The …scal regime is now indexed simply by restrictions on the sequence f t+s g T s=0 and this is the key to understanding the implications of (2.2) for our class of …scal policy rules. First, given , the …scal authority, looking forward from any time t, will always do enough to repay the outstanding debt in existence at the start of time 7 Annex A shows the steady-state implication of this contraint.
t. Thus …scal solvency hinges on the present value of future surpluses and de…cits in t + 1; t + 2; :::. So, we need to clarify the implications of (2.2) for that sequence. It turns out that as time T ! 1 the fundamental requirement for …scal solvency on any monetary-…scal program is that:
In other words, the discounted sum of net government liabilities must tend to zero.
Rewriting our solvency condition in real terms, and assuming that the net de…cit is constant,
We require, for solvency, that the expression in square braces tend to zero in the limit. Expression (2.5) in turn can usefully be re-written as
A su¢ cient condition for this expression to reach zero in the limit is simply that the term in square braces is convergent, as opposed to having a zero limiting value. It can then be shown that this will be the case as long as the following requirement is met in…nitely often:
This expression has a very obvious interpretation in that it requires that the …scal authority must eventually repay a su¢ cient portion of the debt each period so that the discounted sum of net public liabilities tends to zero. 8 Alternatively, we 8 Actually this expression is an approximation, since we ignore the cross term:
8 may think of it as saying that the debt retirement schedule places an upper bound on the feasible real interest rate sequence. That interpretation will be convenient in what follows.
The Model

The Representative Agent
In this section we set out the key structure of the model. The equations characterizing equilibrium choices are derived in detail in the appendix. The utility function, V 0 , for a representative agent, j, is given by,
Here is the subjective discount rate and E 0 is the expectation operator at time 0. The utility function is assumed to be concave and separable in its arguments, C, consumption, M=P , real money balances, where M is nominal money balances and P is the aggregate price-level, L is leisure, which is equal to 1 N , where available time is normalized to unity and N is labor input. In practice we shall assume log-separability, that is, U ( )
representative agent maximizes expected utility subject to a sequence of per period ‡ow constraints:
where, 
: The expression (2.7) is closely mimicked by the term we derive from a dynamic macro model in Section 4, equation 4.2 and equations 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 for the selection of Ricardian or non-Ricardian …scal policy, respectively. But in the latter case, note that because the debt retirement rate is too low then monetary policy is further restricted. 9 which costs p t (z). In addition, W t denotes the nominal wage, t denotes pro…ts remitted from …rms where each agent receives essentially a pooled dividend, T t denotes lump sum taxes, B t denotes the nominal stock of bonds held over at the end of period t 1 and i t is the economy-wide period nominal interest rate. The evolution of …nancial wealth, F , is given by
This sequence of equations together with the transversality condition,
t+T ! 0 help ensure that the agent's optimization problem is well behaved. Consumption is de…ned over the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator function, where is the elasticity of demand for good (z),
with the aggregate price-level de…ned accordingly as:
The derivation of the agent's optimal supply and demand decisions are standard and are relegated to Annex B.
The Representative Firm
We assume that there are a large number of in…nitely-lived monopolistically competitive …rms, who use only labor in the production of their di¤erentiated good. Each period these …rms receive a symmetric productivity shock. So for …rm i the production function at time t is given by
where 0 < < 1, and A t is the productivity innovation. We further assume that …rms face Calvo-type restrictions in setting prices but that …rms meet demand whether or not they have been able to change prices that period. The optimal price is given by
is the rate of time preference, denotes the probability of the …rm having to charge the same price next period as it did the period before, t is the marginal utility of consumption, t is real marginal cost and Y d t is an index of aggregate demand. Equations (3.5) and (3.7) jointly imply the New Keynesian Phillips curve. We make standard assumptions on …rms'involvement in the labour market.
Again, Annex B contains further details.
Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We turn now to consider our class of feedback policy rules. As is well understood this sticky price system implies demand determined output which may di¤er from its ‡exible price steady-state (see Woodford, 2003) . We shall therefore consider the setting of the per period nominal interest rate and the primary surplus in order to stabilize this system, that is policy rules of the form:
and
assume that the …scal authority, as is standard, sets taxes in response to the level of contemporaneous government expenditure (which we assume is exogenous), that seigniorage is returned lump-sum to the private sector, and crucially that taxes respond to the level of debt outstanding at the start of the period. It is the response of taxes to a given expenditure stream and the evolution of endogenous variables that sets the per period …scal surplus. Fiscal policy has a number of channels through which it acts. The …rst is the direct channel by a¤ecting aggregate demand, that is period output, in the economy. When the …scal policy authority runs a procyclical surplus over the business cycle, output will stay closer its ‡ex-price level. 9 The second channel operates by interacting with the monetary policy maker, who is acting to stabilize in ‡ation. Because expected in ‡ation has output as an argument and output is being somewhat tempered by …scal policy, the interest rate is better able to stabilize in ‡ation because the …scal policy maker is also stabilizing output. Taylor (1999b) has recently demonstrated that a relationship such as (3.9) can be used to model the course of the surplus in US data.
Stability and Determinacy
In this section we analyze the local stability conditions to ensure a unique REE for the model derived in Section 3. We have linearized that model and appendix B sets out these linear relations in full for: consumption (B1); money demand (B2); the evolution of wealth (B3); New Keynesian Phillips curve (B4); output (B5); interest rate rule (B6); …scal rule (B7); and public sector budget constraint (B8).
Our analysis leads to a model with 8 endogenous variables and Annex B shows how we reduce the dimensions of this system to three. This set of three stochastic 9 We shall see that the stabilizing properties of this …rst channel are restricted because if the …scal policy maker attempts to stabilize output or in ‡ation over some threshold there will more work for monetary policy to do to stabilize this economy. Hence, we partition the …scal policy response into moderate and aggressive. Note unlike Leeper (1991) aggressive (active in Leeper's terminology) …scal policy here is not about the stability of debt but about the …scal policy maker's propensity to stabilize the economy. 12 di¤erence equations can then be written in compact form as:
where the vector of endogenous variables, z t , is given by:
A is a 3 3 matrix and G a 3 1 matrix of coe¢ cients and x t represents the bounded forcing process acting on bonds, consumption and in ‡ation, which is the transpose of hf t ;ĥ t ;x t i . The square matrix A will have 3 eigenvalues corresponding to each endogenous variable. Standard analysis tells us that the existence of a unique rational expectations solution for the vector, z t , depends upon the number of eigenvalues of the square matrix, A, that lie outside the unit circle (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) , corresponding to the number of non-predetermined variables. In this case a locally unique equilibrium depends on there being two eigenvalues that lie outside the unit circle. These roots in the familiar Ricardian case are associated with in ‡ation (forward-looking due to the Calvo speci…cation) and consumption, as agents consume out of present-value income. However, these familiar root conditions rely on a restriction in the government's budget constraint that ‡ows from the robustness of the debt repayment schedule. We enlarge on this point below.
Because of the block triangular structure, the analysis of the roots of the model is relatively straightforward. We note that the matrix A can be partitioned into pre-determined and non-predetermined variables, with matrix B corresponding to the pre-determined variable and the 2 2 matrix D corresponding to the non-predetermined variables. Note that money simply does not matter for this equilibrium as it is pinned down by the consumption and in ‡ation. 
The Ricardian case
We can locate the MTPL or Ricardian case by analyzing the eigenvalue of matrix B, which corresponds to the debt accumulation equation, and is simply given by (1 ) 1 . Then we have that:
The similarity of this expression with (2.7) is clear. In the event that this root does not lie in that space, then a stable root has to be recovered from matrix D and we analyze this non-Ricardian (FTPL) case below. Proposition 4.1. A Ricardian regime requires that the rate at which government debt is retired, , is no less than one minus the rate of time preference.
There is a clear intuition for the Ricardian case in that there is a commitment to retire debt at a rate more than the rate it is expanding, = (1 + ) = (1 ). Should this condition not be met then monetary policy will be directly constrained as we make clear below under an FTPL. We shall consider the implications for monetary policy when a Ricardian regime is in place, under MTPL, for Regions 1 and 2 and when Proposition 4.1 is violated when considering Regions 3 and 4, that is a non-Ricardian regime.
First, we concentrate on establishing the determinacy conditions for the remaining 2 2 matrix describing the evolution of the two non-predetermined variables of z t , that isĉ t and^ t . We show that such a matrix will admit a number of distinct parameter constellations under which both eigenvalues will lie outside the unit circle. We will discover that the …rst case corresponds to 'moderate' …scal policy and the second to 'aggressive' …scal policy. Recall that aggressive …scal policy is simply indexed by the extent to which the surplus responds to endogenous state variables i.e., 
where
, G is a parameter matrix and _ x t is the vector of forcing variables acting on consumption and in ‡ation, respectively. In Annex B we show that matrix D is given by:
Assuming a Ricardian regime, we establish the threshold values for f y and f such that the …scal policy can be thought of as moderate and not acting with su¢ cient force to alter standard prescriptions on the operation of interest rate rules. Our …rst condition is standard and requires that:
In the absence of …scal policy, ( Conditions (4.5) and (4.7) indicate there exists an upper bound on …scal policy action towards in ‡ation, which we interpret, in conjunction with the limit on f y , as the limit to …scal moderation. It is straightforward to see that (4.5) and (4.7)
collapse to an identical expression when restriction (4.3) holds with equality. So the attainment of condition (4.7) as an inequality will relax the restrictiveness of condition (4.5), where m is an argument, and so when condition (4.7) is satis…ed so will condition (4.5).
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Therefore only if …scal policy does not observe the constraints derived here will condition (4.3) be insu¢ cient to determine a unique REE. We discuss the case of by the …scal rule, the current period in ‡ation rate becomes more sensitive to a given stream of expected in ‡ation and so will require more aggressive stabilization by the interest rate rule. We can see this point quite easily by noting that when the …scal surplus targets in ‡ation, output becomes a function of in ‡ation. When we then substitute out for in ‡ation we then …nd that in ‡ation is more sensitive to a given stream of expected output gaps i.e. the Phillips curve becomes more vertical.
In e¤ect, even though in ‡ation continues to be pinned down by the expansion of output, when the …scal policy maker also uses output to stabilize in ‡ation there are reduced output e¤ects from any given stream of demand shocks meaning that in ‡ation may respond instead. Note that in ‡ation may become more volatile unless further more aggressive interest rate policy is adopted. Moderate and Ricardian …scal policy is thus a necessary pre-condition for the Taylor Principle to e¤ect a determinate equilibrium. We also …nd that: We note that condition (4.11) shows that aggressive …scal policy, in the spirit of Section 2, per se raises the lower bound for the sequence of interest rates.
We also …nd that the extent to which the interest rate rule can stabilize the economy by reacting to output is enhanced. Note that m y in this region is premultiplied by a number near three rather than near zero (i:e:1 ), as in Region 1. Recall that …scal policy acts through aggregate demand and aggression towards output, as indexed by f y and f leads, in general, to the need for a substantially more aggressive interest rate rule than that suggested by (4.3) alone.
Unabated aggressive …scal policy will set out to drive output when it is above (below) its ‡exible price level back below (above) its ‡exible price level and hence will require more aggressive monetary policy, particularly towards output. But note rather than ceding control over the determinacy of a unique REE, monetary policy can act with some strength, particularly towards output, which has an increasing fraction set by (aggressive) …scal policy. Unless such …scal policy can be ruled out by commitment there is a strong case for monetary policy to act strongly towards output as well as in ‡ation in order to determine a unique REE.
Proposition 4.3. Under aggressive …scal policy, just greater than an equiproportional response to in ‡ation is generally insu¢ cient to ensure a unique REE, as more aggressive output stabilizing policy is generally required.
The Non-Ricardian case
Recall from our discussion of Proposition 4.1 that should matrix B not yield a (backward) stable root, then we have to recover such a root from matrix D. In this case, the eigenvalue of matrix B will be given by:
Hence, for our purposes, policy elasticities need to generate 'saddlepath'behavior from matrix D; where we require one root to lie outside the unit circle, and one root to lie inside the unit circle. Again we are required to distinguish between 'moderate' and 'aggressive' …scal responses. We note that in this case, the government's PVBC can only hold if the interest rate sequence does not react much to in ‡ation, and so the stream of interest rates no longer meets condition (4.3) . We will …nd, as well as this upper bound on the feasible interest rate sequence, the FTPL also places restrictions on the lower bound for interest rates. 
The point here is that the interest rate rule ends up being severely restricted: it is necessary for monetary policy to breach Condition (4.3) and move no less than equiproportionally with in ‡ation. 14 In this region, the …scal policy maker, who has not committed to stabilize the debt stock requires in ‡ation to stabilize the real value of public liabilities. In this case, the monetary policy maker must not act to stabilize in ‡ation i.e. by raising real rates, because that will act to raise the current value of government liabilities (see equation B8 in Annex B) because the current value of future surpluses would be reduced by such action. Under moderate …scal policy, the left hand side of the conditions are not particularly restrictive as we note that for m y , f y 0 they are bounded above at -1. As output stabilization by the interest rate rule has limited e¢ cacy in this set-up, (since the rate of transformation from output to in ‡ation is relatively low i.e.
(1 )= ), it is still possible for the interest rate rule to stabilize output to some great extent, even under the FTPL. We …nd a similar story under aggressive …scal policy to that under moderate.
There is an upper bound constraint on the interest rate sequence, once we 14 A version of this result was originally exposited in Woodford (1996) . introduce the FTPL, and some role for output stabilization by the interest rate rule remains. But for su¢ ciently aggressive …scal stabilization of in ‡ation, we …nd that the extent to which the interest rate stabilizes in ‡ation becomes irrelevant.
In this region the bounds on interest rate stabilization are likely to matter from below and from above. In the next subsection we will illustrate these …ndings in a little more detail.
Proposition 4.5. Under non-Ricardian and aggressive …scal policy, monetary policy operates within a signi…cantly constrained parameter sub-space and can be treated as being required to be …xed.
Illustration of Key Results
In this section, we illustrate some the key results outlined in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 with some simple plots of determinate zones under various monetary and …scal strategies. Figure 1 plots, for standard parameter values (see Table 1 shows, for m = 1 (loosely speaking when the Taylor Principle is just being met), the rate at which the monetary authority must increase the weight on output should the …scal rule stabilize in ‡ation to a signi…cant degree. Unless ruled out by commitment to …scal moderation, more aggressive in ‡ation stabilization by the interest rate rule would act to mitigate the impact of in ‡ation stabilization by the …scal rule. The dotted line shows, for example, that when m = 2 the …scal authority must place a weight of over 3 on in ‡ation before output stabilization by the interest rate rule is strictly necessary. Figure 2 illustrates the zone of determinacy for Condition (4.7) where the interest rate rule is constrained to employ output stabilization alone. Note the central (thick) line corresponds very closely to the central line for Figure 1 . This is because the two conditions collapse to an identical one when m (1 ) m y = 1. We illustrate the limited implications for the interest rate rule that result from altering the extent of (moderate) …scal stabilization as the shifts in the curves partitioning stability are relatively small. This is because there is little intertemporal shifting of demand brought about by …scal surpluses stabilizing output in this setup. However, for signi…cantly large in ‡ation weights in the …scal rule, output stabilization by the interest rate rule would become a requirement since in ‡ation has a clear intertemporal price, as the rate at which expected in ‡ation is traded for current output.
For Figure 3 , we maintain the partition for Ricardian …scal policy, such that the MTPL obtains, but illustrate the implications of allowing the …scal rule to place a large weight on output stabilization. In each case we maintain an equiproportional response on the interest rate rule to an in ‡ation shock, m = 1. We therefore show the extent to which output must be targeted by the interest rate rule as 'aggressive'…scal policy places an increasingly higher weight on output. Note also that greater in ‡ation stabilization by the …scal rule also impacts directly on the extent of required output stabilization by the interest rate rule. Figure 4 illustrates the FTPL, in which …scal policy becomes non-Ricardian.
In this case, the two equations for output and in ‡ation must deliver a saddlepoint.
As a result, monetary policy is constrained to the converse of the Taylor Principle, see (4.12) i.e., real rates should not rise in the face of an in ‡ation shock. This might be interpreted as a what might happen under a zero bound, when policy cannot fall to o¤set falling in ‡ation. The upper line in Figure 4 illustrates the upper bound constraint on m and the lower line illustrates that a large set of negative in ‡ation weights on the interest rate rule are possible and that the implicit constraints on output in the monetary rule are somewhat attenuated. Figure 5 illustrates the FTPL under the further supposition that …scal policy is aggressive. Note that, in this case, the extent to which …scal policy stabilizes in ‡ation acts to constrain further the feasible choices for in ‡ation stabilization by the interest rate rule. In fact we show that for su¢ ciently large weights on in ‡ation in the …scal rule, i.e., f > 3, it is not in ‡ation stabilization that matters for the attainment of a unique REE but the weight the interest rate places on 23 output.
These Figures illustrate the main results of this paper: that stabilization policy pursued jointly by monetary and …scal policy may well require some additional weight on output in the monetary rule. Under moderate …scal policy that additional weight may not be a requirement. But there are conditions when that additional weight appears to be more substantial. Speci…cally, we show that if …scal policy responds to any great extent to in ‡ation or output, monetary policy needs to respond robustly towards output to be sure of bringing about a unique REE. Finally, we have shown that under the FTPL interest rates cannot stabilize in ‡ation but that output stabilization remains possible and under aggressive …scal policy may be a requirement of a unique REE. Without well understood restrictions on …scal policy, interest rates may need to respond more forcefully to output.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyse a simple micro-founded model in which both monetary and …scal policy may play a role in stabilization. By closing …scal policy down we note that this model reverts to the set of in ‡ation and output equations employed with such widescale e¤ect in the literature (see Woodford, 2003) . This model turns out to be a special case where …scal policy is 'moderate', non-in ‡ation stabilizing and Ricardian. This is a key …nding, which implies that a policy maker looking to implement standard policy prescriptions involving the Taylor Principle must ensure …scal policy stabilizes debt and is not too aggressively stabilizing: simply announcing an in ‡ation target is not going to be enough.
We studied the conditions for ensuring a unique REE for this model when …scal policy can be Ricardian or non-Ricardian, and is also either moderate or aggressive. Monetary policy invoking the 'Taylor Principle'is su¢ cient to obtain stability under non-aggressive …scal policy with the important proviso that …scal policy does not act against in ‡ation to any great extent. But we also show that the Taylor Principle is palpably insu¢ cient to ensure stability when …scal policy is aggressive and strictly ruled out when non-Ricardian.
In Finally it should not escape our attention that if the Taylor Principle cannot be observed, perhaps because of the zero bound constraint or some such other impediment to monetary policy, then non-Ricardian …scal policy may well be required for the economy to obtain stability. The growth of public debt under the current crisis thus seems to be relevant to note and any tendency to switch regime, from MTPL to FTPL and then back again, will make statements about any exit strategy pivotal.
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Annex A: A1 The Budget Constraint
The period constraint is,
We analyze …scal rules of the form,
Let S t (1 t )G t denote the per period net surplus. If we substitute A.2 into A.l, de ‡ate, we …nd in steady state that.
Annex B: B1 The Solution
Using the model set out in Section 3 of the main paper and derived in detail below, we con…ne ourselves to consider equilibria in which the vector of endogenous variables, given the policy rules in place, remains close to the value it would take in a stationary deterministic equilibrium.
The Model The Representative Agent Optimality conditions Let f t g 1 t=0 be a (state-dependent) temporal sequence of Lagrange multipliers associated with the ‡ow budget constraint of the agent. At each date and in each state the following equations, (1.1)-(1.4) are amongst requirements for an interior optimum; 1 P t C t = t ; (5.1)
Using equations (1.1) and (1.4) in (1.2) uncovers the money demand relation:
(1.1) and (1.4) imply the consumption Euler equation:
The labor supply function results from (1.1) and (1.3):
The Representative Firm It is well known that in our framework the demand for the i th product is given by
denotes aggregate demand, the sum of private expenditure and government expenditure. In the model we develop there will be an e¤ect directly from government expenditure. A cost-minimizing …rm required to meet current demand will hire labor according to the following optimality condition,
where t measures real marginal cost. Total per-period pro…ts then are given by
As regards price setting behavior we follow Calvo (1983) and many subsequent analysts and assume that …rms which set prices in period t face a probability, (0 < 1) of having to live with the same decision next period. More generally, we assume that a …rm which sets its price this period faces the probability k of having to charge the same price in k-periods time. The …rm now has to choose its optimal price. 15 The optimal price, s p t , is therefore given by:
Here t+k is marginal utility where the main impact on optimal prices is given by the stream of current and expected real marginal costs. The evolution of the aggregate price-level is given by a weighted average of this period's optimal price and last period aggregate price:
These linear approximations to the model's key equations are straightforward to derive and are given below:
w t+1 = (b=w)b t + (1 b=w)m t ; (B3 Evolution of Wealth) t = E t^ t+1 + ŷ t ; (B4 New Keynesian Phillips Curve)
In a series of simple steps we substitute out the following endogenous state variables:{ t ,m t ,ŵ t+1 ,ŷ t ,ŝ t . Note …rst that we can substitute output as it is simply a weighted average of consumption and the choices on the …scal rule, B7.
We normalize the natural rate to zero. Substitution of the interest rate rule, A6, and the New Keynesian Phillips curve, B4, solved for^ t+1 , allows us to re-write the consumption Euler equation in terms of consumption and in ‡ation alone. In the representative agent set-up here government debt is part of …nancial wealth and so is uniquely pre-determined for the next period as a weighted average of debt and money holdings, it does not need to enter the state vector. Similarly and …nally, we note that the quantity of money is this model is simply pinned down by period consumption and interest rate choices we do not need to specify money as a separate variable within the state vector.
B3 Jacobian Matrix
There is a well developed theory for the existence of a unique rational expectations solution for a system of linear di¤erence equations. The resulting system of di¤erence equations can be written in compact form as:
where the vector of state variables, z t 2 < n and is given by:
where n = 3 and the n n matrix A has constant coe¢ cients and is given by: 
B4 Eigenvalues
The solution of this system is z t = A t z 0 and hence the dynamic behaviour of the system depends upon the stability, or otherwise, of the square matrix, A. The stability of which will in turn depend upon the values of roots of the characteristic polynomial, speci…cally whether their moduli is either less than or equal to or greater than unity. The roots of A are given by the solutions to the characteristic polynomial, where, represent the roots and I is the identity matrix:
The square matrix A will have n eigenvalues corresponding to each state variable. One way to arrive at the eigenvalues is through use of the Jordan canonical decomposition which requires that there also exists a nonsingular n n matrix, B, such that :
where represents a diagonal matrix in which each entry ii contains one of n distinct eigenvalues of A, n , ordered by increasing absolute value. This matrix can thus further be decomposed into the following form:
Such that the m eigenvalues of 1 lie inside the unit circle and the n m eigenvalues of 2 lie outside the unit circle. Standard analysis tells us that the existence of a unique bounded rational expectations solution for the vector, z t , depends upon the number of eigenvalues of the square matrix, A, that lie inside the unit circle (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) , m , corresponding exactly to the number of non-predetermined state variables, m, which will, of course, imply that the number of eigenvalues on or outside the unit circle, n m . For our model, n m = 2.
But because of the block triangular structure of the matrix, A is decomposable or reducible such that we note that the matrix A can be partitioned into predetermined and non-predetermined variables, with 2 x 2 matrix D corresponding to the Jacobian for the non-predetermined variables, and B corresponding to the Jacobian for the pre-determined variable(s).
The canonical decomposition can then be undertaken on matrices B and D separately from the eigenvalues can be obtained. First, we consider the case of B which will deliver a stable eigenvalue if its diagonal element is less than one in which case we will require the matrix D to deliver two unstable eigenvalues in order for the sequence fzg 1 t=0 to be bounded to a unique rational expectations equilibrium. Secondly, we consider the case in which B does not deliver a stable eigenvalue and then in which case the matrix D will be required to deliver one stable and one unstable eigenvalue. It is thus the choice on the diagonal of the B matrix that determines how monetary and …scal policy should operate in order to ensure a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Let us concentrate on the matrix D for which we outline the conditions under which the roots, 1 and 2 lie inside or outside the unit circle. First, we factor the characteristic polynomial and examine whether the roots fall outside the unit circle, p (1).
p (1) = (1 1 ) (1 2 ) = 1 ( 1 + 2 ) + 1 2 (B12)
Clearly in the case where both roots lie inside or outside the unit circle the p(1) > 0 but in the case of positive roots either side of the unit circle A9 will be negative.
Case 1 -1;2 < j1j ; p (1) > 0: For 1;2 < j1j, then 1 2 < 1 and 1 + 2 < 2.
Case 2 -1;2 > j1j ; p (1) > 0: For 1;2 > j1j, then 1 2 > j1j and 1 + 2 > j2j.
Case 3 -1 < j1j and 2 > j1j ; p (1) < 0:
For 1 + 2 > 0, 1 2 ( 1 + 2 ) < 1 and 1 2 + ( 1 + 2 ) > 1; For 1 + 2 < 0, 1 2 ( 1 + 2 ) > 1 and 1 2 + ( 1 + 2 ) < 1.
Clearly for the MTPL, Case 2 applies and for the FTPL Case 3 applies. We then must examine the parameters of the D matrix and determine whether subject to the eigenvalue from the B matrix whether one or two unstable eigenvalues are required to ensure the satisfaction of a unique rational expectations equilibrium for the state vector z t . 
